

# Evolving Contracts

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(Work in progress with Gordon Pace and Gerardo Schneider)

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- 5 Security policies
- 6 Contracts in virtual organisations, multi-agent systems, etc

- Principals evolve
  - Systems evolve
  - Contracts should evolve
- Most works on contracts only deal with static contracts
  - One exception: administrative role-based access control



- Long-term goal: develop a unifying theory of contracts, covering different issues such as:
  - contract generation, composition and *evolution*
  - contract analysis and verification
  - first-class contracts
- Short-term goals:
  - model dynamicity of contracts: spillover, power
  - provide enforcement mechanisms for dynamic contracts
  - study the relationship and correctness of the distinct enforcement mechanisms

## Contracts, informally


- Agreements between a system involving two or more parties
    - asymmetric: user and provider, producer and consumer, etc.
    - symmetric: participants in social networks, P2P networks, etc
  - Regulate actions that a system may undertake
  - Static contracts are fully determined at onset.
- 
- We are interested in enforceable contracts:
    - ie contracts can be validated against a reference semantics (of contracts and systems).
  - For the purpose of this talk, one can think of a system as a (possibly distributed) program in which code from different principals are executed.

- Formalize enforcement mechanisms for contracts
- Prove/disprove equivalence between mechanisms


## Plan

- Start with static contracts
- Extend to dynamic contracts

# Verifying Static Contracts



# Verifying Dynamic Contracts



# Setting – dimensions of choice

- What is a system and which modelling language to use?
- Which contract language (syntax and semantics) to use?
- When does a system comply with a contract?

Each dimension is a topic on its own.

# Setting – formalisation

- Systems are modelled as sequences of actions. Formally, we consider a set  $A$  of actions and let  $Trace = A^*$ .
- Contracts are modelled as predicates over systems. Formally, we consider a set  $Contract$  of contracts, and a relation  $\vdash_{\text{off}} \subseteq Trace \times Contract$ .
- Pros: very general and applicable.
  - Captures essential issues of contract enforcement
  - Abstracts away the specifics of formalisms for contracts and systems
- Cons:
  - Time escapes the model, among many other parameters
  - Hyperproperties are not considered

There is still a story to tell. . .

# Motivating example: DRM (after Barth and Mitchell)

- Consider a scenario with an online music store using DRM.
- Users receive rights to play digital songs.
- Alice may pay to obtain the permission to listen to songs  $a$ ,  $b$ , and  $c$  for a total of ten times.
- For being a loyal customer, the following day, the store decides to provide Alice with a promotion to either play song  $d$  once before the end of the month, or to play either song  $d$  or  $a$  once before the end of the month.



# Motivating example: DRM (after Barth and Mitchell)

- Alice obtains the right to listen to songs  $a$ ,  $b$  and  $c$  for a total of ten times.
- Alice plays song  $a$  twice,  $b$  four times, and  $c$  three times, for a total of nine plays.
- The DRM agent in her music player decrypts the songs, allows Alice to play the songs, and notes that she has one play remaining.
- The following day, Alice receives another promotion — she is offered the choice of two rights:
  - the right to play song  $d$  once; or
  - the right to play either song  $a$  or song  $d$  once.

She opts for the second right because she reasons that it is more flexible.

# DRM: Choosing rights and the right to choose

- The rights Alice now possesses are:
  - Play either song  $a$ ,  $b$ , or  $c$  (acquired the first day).
  - Play either song  $a$  or  $d$  before the end of the month.
- If she now listens to song  $a$ , which right should the DRM manager opt to strike out?
- If it strikes out the second (as the more restrictive), she will not be able to listen to  $d$  later on.
- But if she had chosen the more restrictive promotion, the second option would have been struck out, and she would have been able to listen to song  $d$  later on.
- In fact: no online algorithm can be complete.
- The problem is due to non-atomic rights.

# Verification of static contracts: the big picture

We define three enforcement mechanisms

- Offline verification
- Online verification
- History-based verification
- State-based verification

and provide conditions under which they coincide.

Contract is updated after every action:

$$step \in A \rightarrow Contract \rightarrow Contract_{\perp}$$

(*step* is undefined whenever the action violates the contract)

## Satisfaction

$$\begin{array}{l} \langle \rangle \vdash_{dyn} C \stackrel{df}{=} \langle \rangle \vdash_{off} C \\ a :: t \vdash_{dyn} C \stackrel{df}{=} t \vdash_{dyn} step(a, C) \quad \text{if } step(a, C) \neq \perp \\ a :: t \vdash_{dyn} C \stackrel{df}{=} \text{false} \quad \text{if } step(a, C) = \perp \end{array}$$

# Soundness and completeness of online verification

Let  $C$  range over contracts,  $t$  over traces, and  $a$  over actions.

## Soundness

$$t \vdash_{\text{off}} \text{step}(a, C) \Rightarrow a :: t \vdash_{\text{off}} C$$

If  $\text{step}$  is sound, then for every contract  $C$  and trace  $t$

$$t \vdash_{\text{onl}} C \Rightarrow t \vdash_{\text{off}} C$$

## Completeness

$$t \vdash_{\text{off}} \text{step}(a, C) \Leftarrow a :: t \vdash_{\text{off}} C$$

If  $\text{step}$  is complete, then for every contract  $C$  and trace  $t$

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# Application: simple language of rights and obligations

- $A = R \sqcup O$
- $Contract = R^+ \times O^+$  (multisets as conjunctions)
- $t \vdash_{\text{off}} (C_r, C_o)$  iff  $C_o \subseteq t_o$  and  $t_r \subseteq C_r$
- where  $t_o$  and  $t_r$  are the projections of  $t$  over obligations and rights.

## Step function

$$step(a, (C_r, C_o)) = \begin{cases} (C_r \setminus \{a\}, C_o) & \text{if } a \in R \wedge a \in C_r \\ \perp & \text{if } a \in R \wedge a \notin C_r \\ (C_r, C_o \setminus \{a\}) & \text{if } a \in O \end{cases}$$

(Note that  $\setminus$  is defined for multisets of actions, therefore removes at most one occurrence of an action from a multiset of actions.)

$step$  is sound and complete.

# Non-application: non-atomic rights

- Rights are disjunctions of atomic rights (a la DRM)
- $Contract = (R^+)^+ \times O^+$  (multisets as conjunctions)
- $t \vdash_{\text{off}} (C_r, C_o)$  iff  $C_o \subseteq t_o$  and  $t_r \sqsubseteq C_r$  where:
  - $t_o$  and  $t_r$  are the projections of  $t$  over obligations and rights
  - $I \sqsubseteq I'$  if there exists  $I_0 \subseteq I'$  such that  $I \leq I'$  pointwise.

## Step function

$$step(a, (C_r, C_o)) = \begin{cases} (C_r \setminus \{b\}, C_o) & \text{if } a \in R \wedge a \leq b \wedge b \in C_r \\ \perp & \text{if } a \in R \wedge a \notin C_r \\ (C_r, C_o \setminus \{a\}) & \text{if } a \in O \end{cases}$$

(Note that  $step$  is not a function.)

No function whose graph is included in  $step$  is sound and complete.

# History-based verification

Contract is updated after a set of actions, and only when it does not restrict future (legitimate) choices of users.

$$h\text{-step} \in \text{Trace} \times \text{Contract} \rightarrow (\text{Trace} \times \text{Contract})_{\perp, \text{void}}$$

$h\text{-step}$  returns void if the trace/contract pair is not updated.

## Satisfaction (simplified definition)

$$\begin{array}{lll} t \vdash_{\text{hist}} C & \stackrel{df}{=} & t \vdash_{\text{off}} C & \text{if } h\text{-step}(t, C) = \text{void} \\ t_0 \frown t \vdash_{\text{hist}} C & \stackrel{df}{=} & t' \frown t \vdash_{\text{hist}} C' & \text{if } h\text{-step}(t_0, C) = (t', C') \\ t_0 \frown t \vdash_{\text{hist}} C & \stackrel{df}{=} & \text{false} & \text{if } h\text{-step}(t_0, C) = \perp \end{array}$$

Generalizes offline verification (always map to void), and online verification (always update based on first element of the list).



# Soundness and completeness of history-based verification

Let  $C$  range over contracts,  $t$  over traces, and  $a$  over actions.

## Soundness

$$t' \frown t \vdash_{\text{off}} C' \wedge h\text{-step}(t_0 \frown t, C) = (t', C') \Rightarrow t_0 \frown t \vdash_{\text{off}} C$$

If  $h\text{-step}$  is sound, then for every contract  $C$  and trace  $t$

$$t \vdash_{\text{hist}} C \Rightarrow t \vdash_{\text{off}} C$$

## Completeness

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} t' \frown t \vdash_{\text{off}} C' \wedge h\text{-step}(t_0 \frown t, C) = (t', C') \\ \vee \\ h\text{-step}(t_0 \frown t, C) = \text{void} \end{array} \right\} \Leftarrow t_0 \frown t \vdash_{\text{off}} C$$

If  $step$  is complete, then for every contract  $C$  and trace  $t$

$$t \vdash_{\text{hist}} C \Leftarrow t \vdash_{\text{off}} C$$

# Application: non-atomic rights

One can define sound and complete history-based enforcement for non-atomic rights. Many strategies:

- Remove sets of rights as soon as possible

$$\text{remove} : R^+ \times (R^+)^+ \rightarrow R^+ \times (R^+)^+$$

(w/o compromising soundness)

## Step function

$$h\text{-step}(t, (C_r, C_o)) = \begin{cases} (C_r, C_o \setminus \{a\}) & \text{if } a \in O \\ (t'_r, (C'_r, C_o)) & \text{if } t = a :: t_0 \wedge a \in R \wedge \\ & \text{remove}(t_r, C_r) = (t'_r, C'_r) \\ \dots & \end{cases}$$

- One can try to remove sets of rights at regular intervals
- One never removes sets of rights (offline verification is a special case)

- Recall the DRM system, in which Alice had a contract  $C$ , is a set of disjunctions of permissions to listen to songs.
- The history  $h$  is a multiset of rights that were consumed but not yet deducted from the contract.
- When Alice listens to a song  $s$ :
  - if there is a deterministic way of reducing the current contract  $C$  with history  $s :: h$  then reduce it and remove the relevant rights from  $C$ , and update history;
  - otherwise simply extend history with  $s$ .
- For example, with contract  $(a \vee b) \wedge (a \vee c) \wedge (b \vee d)$ , upon hearing song  $a$ , we do not know which clause to remove, so we don't remove any. If we then receive a  $c$ , we can now use up both the  $a$  and  $c$  to reduce the contract to get  $b \vee d$ .

# Dynamic contracts

- Contracts are sets of clauses
- Clauses can be enacted or withdrawn throughout execution
- We consider an extended set of actions with specific actions for enacting and withdrawal of clauses

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## New notions

- Spillover: what happens if a clause is withdrawn?
- Power: who enacts or withdraws clauses

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## New notions

- Spillover: what happens if a clause is withdrawn?
- Power: who enacts or withdraws clauses

## Warning

- Work in progress.
- Need to instantiate new notions to multiple languages.

# What is spillover?

When a clause is withdrawn, some parts of it may spillover beyond its termination. Examples:

- For the coming week, if you pay for a song, you will get an extra song download for free.
- If you buy three songs, you get an extra one for free.
- You are allowed to transfer resources tax-free to another player, but if you leave the group before they are delivered, you will have pay taxes on them.



New actions to enact and withdraw a contract

$$\bar{A} ::= A \mid \text{enact}(\text{Loc}, \text{Contract}) \mid \text{withdraw}(\text{Loc}, \text{Loc})$$

(second location in withdrawal used for spillover)

## Traces

Subject to well-formedness conditions. Should never:

- contain two enactments at the same location;
- withdraw twice at the same location;
- update a contract at an already active location;
- withdraw a clause that was not enacted or present at the onset of executions;
- set up a spillover clause through a withdrawal at a location in use.

# Active and consumed locations

Start from a set  $L_0$  of initially active locations.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ActLoc}_{L_0}(\langle \rangle) &= L_0 \\ \text{ActLoc}_{L_0}(\text{enact}(n, c) :: t) &= \{n\} \cup \text{ActLoc}_{L_0}(t) \\ \text{ActLoc}_{L_0}(\text{withdraw}(n, n') :: t) &= \{n'\} \cup \text{ActLoc}_{L_0}(t) \setminus \{n\} \\ \text{ActLoc}_{L_0}(a :: t) &= \text{ActLoc}_{L_0}(t) \end{aligned}$$

where in the last clause it is assumed that  $a$  neither enacts nor withdraws an action.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ConsLoc}_{L_0}(\langle \rangle) &= L_0 \\ \text{ConsLoc}_{L_0}(\text{enact}(n, c) :: t) &= \{n\} \cup \text{ConsLoc}_{L_0}(t) \\ \text{ConsLoc}_{L_0}(\text{withdraw}(n, n') :: t) &= \{n'\} \cup \text{ConsLoc}_{L_0}(t) \\ \text{ConsLoc}_{L_0}(a :: t) &= \text{ConsLoc}_{L_0}(t) \end{aligned}$$

Every active location is also consumed.

# Extracting subtraces wrt consumed locations

Let  $n$  be a consumed location in  $t$ . The active subtrace of  $t$  for  $n$  is  $G_{L_0}(t, n) = \text{reduce}(t')$  where  $t'$  is uniquely determined by the decomposition:

$$t = t' \frown \text{withdraw}(n, n') \frown t_1$$

$$t = t_0 \frown \text{enact}(n, c) \frown t' \frown \text{withdraw}(n, n') \frown t_1$$

$$t = t_0 \frown \text{enact}(n, c) \frown t'$$

$$t = t_0 \frown \text{withdraw}(n', n) \frown t' \frown \text{withdraw}(n, n'') \frown t_1$$

$$t = t_0 \frown \text{withdraw}(n', n) \frown t'$$

where in the first case it is implicitly assumed that  $n \in L_0$  and in the third and fifth cases that  $\text{withdraw}(n, n') \notin t'$ .

# Initial clause of a location

- Let  $spillover : A^* \times Contract \rightarrow Contract$ .
- Let  $F : L_0 \rightarrow Contract$ .
- Define  $\hat{F} : \forall t, ConsLoc_{L_0}(t) \times \bar{A}^* \rightarrow Contract$ .

$$\hat{F}(t, n) = \begin{cases} F(n) & \text{if } n \in L_0 \\ c & \text{if } t = t_0 \frown enact(n, c) \frown t' \\ spillover(t', \hat{F}(t', n')) & \text{if } t = t_0 \frown withdraw(n', n) \frown t_1 \\ & \text{and } t' = G_{L_0}(t, n) \end{cases}$$

Let  $t$  be a trace and  $C$  be a contract mapping.

- Local validity for a location  $n$ :  $t \bar{F}_{offl} (n, C)$  iff  $G_{L_0}(t, n) \vdash_{offl} \hat{F}(t, n)$
- Global validity:  $t \bar{F}_{offl} C$  iff  $t \bar{F}_{offl} (n, C)$  for every  $n \in ConsLoc_{L_0}(t)$ .

# Verification of dynamic contracts: the big picture

As before: we define three enforcement mechanisms

- Offline verification
- Online verification
- History-based verification
- State-based verification

and provide conditions under which they coincide.

- Why do we need power?
  - To model who can modify contracts and how
- The roads to power (in progress)
  - Use contracts to control contract evolution
  - Extend the set of actions
  - Reuse previous results on satisfaction and enforcement mechanisms
- Using power (to do)
  - cast existing frameworks for evolving security policies as power
  - more examples

# Models of power: adding principals

- Consider a set of principals, and assign principals to actions
- Specify rights and prohibitions of principals
- Can be checked using a static check function, inducing just side conditions to the definitions in the semantics

But rights and prohibitions of principals are static!



# Models of power: Permissions, Prohibitions and Power

- Add operators for permission  $\mathcal{P}(a)$  and prohibition  $\mathcal{F}(a)$  to do an action  $a$ , in the contract language.
- Principal  $p$  has permission to write contract clause  $c$  at location  $n$  can be written as  $W_p(c, a) = \mathcal{P}(\text{enact}_p(c, n))$ , and prohibition to do so as  $N_p(c, a) = \mathcal{F}(\text{enact}_p(c, n))$ .
- Allow reasoning about power *within* the model itself.
- This can be used to model power delegation.
- Negotiation can also be modelled in this manner, eg by adding rights to change a contract, until the point of agreement, upon which the contract is frozen — all rights to change it are withdrawn.

- Preliminary exploration of dynamic contracts
- Captured two new ideas: spillover and power
- Instantiations to more complex contract languages are required
- Only a first step towards first-class contracts
- Next step is to embed a contract language in a programming language. Hopefully modular in the contract language via a suitable API.